The sign is that which separates - causes a cleaving, causes the cleaving to be recognized as cleaving. For Akhilleus could not have the act of cleaving that was not first predated by the sign of cleaving. To perhaps consider Ockham on this point: that Akhilleus' understanding of cleaving stems from the handling of the cleaver - all essences are nominal essences, which presupposes a nomenclature in which to cleave about.
After having spent some time cleaving about signs, handling the cleaver, separating that which can be separated, Akhilleus follows Ockham still further into the snow, cleaving at it all the way, to arrive at the terminus conceptus. Or, that the sign in its natural mode is the concept. But, to Akhilleus, Ockham's natural mode, the conceptual, is another frame of segmentation - too which is cleaved and can be attended to with cleaver.
The instrument of cleaving - as when Nietzsche cleaves about in the field of morals and mores - is history. To attend to Ockham's terminus conceptus as if it were the terminal position would be to "seal every thing and event with a sound". And to this, Akhilleus adds the strike.
Now, history not in the strict sense of historicism, but more specifically in the sense of an account of succession. For the terminus conceptus to truly be fixed - and not just to be fixed as a notion - it would have to exist outside of succession, but it too depends upon succession. And in the time it takes Akhilleus to approach the terminus conceptus at hand - in this case a name, his name, his own nominal essence, the terminal notion - is the time it takes to broach the sign.
To separate by way of cleaver is to broach things from themselves - that is, to pierce a thing's name so that the thing itself retreats. Once the nominal is broached and the thing retreats from its name, the components are made visible: the sign-of-itself (the hollow, the becoming-sign, the representation of what the sign may hold, in time) and the sign-in-itself (round to fit the hollow, the being-sign, the representation of the sign holding, in time).
To broach, then, is to see the sign - both as its material and its concept - fall apart in succession, destruction in succession analogous to reconstruction in succession (there being only a formal distinction between the two). That which can be cleaved is only that which does cleave - to itself, its separate components held together, in succession. If in cleaving to reconstruct the sign-of-itself stumbles at the becoming, the cleaver stumbles into the clear, stumbles as it clears. The cleaver catches itself at the stumble, but that stopping alone causes a stumble. But that stumble is a necessary process of the cleaving, for a stumble can only occur in succession. In stumbling, then, succession is felt, becomes the link between the sign-of-itself and the sign-in-itself, the process between becoming and being.
When this separation brought on by the broach is felt to be as connective as disconnective - stutter.
As a sign that stutters itself into snow slips, the space for slippage dissipates. Into a thin sign, the sign into the space, becomes of the space, as the stutter leaves a variable mark.
To stumble, then, is the notion of the necessary slippage in broaching - the hollow of the sign of the act of cleaving - while the stutter is that aspect, the being-sign, the actual mark left in the snow.
As far as each letter is itself a sign, it too is composed, destructed, reconstructed, in time by cleaving, by stumble and stutter. Regardless of the level of integration of the sign - letter, word, image, sentence - the stumble/stutter process remains the same, formally - all depend upon succession, felt through the stutter of the sign. This process, when specifically regarding the letter, is known by Akhilleus as the strike, to deal with the stutter on a level of the micro-successive.
Each individual stutter of letter cleaves into name - and by stumbling and stuttering, Akhilleus cleaves his name into the snow.
The name - as distinct from a strike, as an integration of strikes - gains the quality of resinance as necessary to the process of integration. As articulated below by Akhilleus in the text left at the site, resinance is a conflation of those qualities of the name - of its resonance and its resin. This is the out-flow and the in-flow of the stutters composing the sign. The pinging of other signs against a particular name, which offsets the name, incurs further stutters; the individual stutters of the strikes that cleave as name. Name, then, is a cleaving of stutters structured by the quality of resinance, as if the principle monad of a body.
But the notion of monad, as the notion of terminus conceptus disregard the necessity of succession, which allows that each stutter of a sign - here, the name, Akhilleus - is equally the site of its construction as its destruction. Every sign is only so fixed as it is fluid.
Akhilleus, by announcing his own name as a stutter, asserts that every sign he erects will be done in conscious stuttering.
This requires a name - Akhilleus.
And with the name in the snow, is the text in the snow.